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This paper investigates the formal pragmatics of ambiguous expressions by
modeling ambiguity in a multi-agent system. Such a framework allows us to give
a more refined notion of the kind of information that is conveyed by ambiguous
expressions. We analyze how ambiguity affects the knowledge of the dialog par-
ticipants and, especially, what they know about each other after an ambiguous
sentence has been uttered. The agents communicate with each other by means of
a tell-function, whose application is constrained by an implementation of some
of Grice’s maxims. The information states of the multi-agent system itself are rep-
resented as a Kripke structures and tell is an update function on those structures.
This framework enables us to distinguish between the information conveyed by
ambiguous sentences vs. the information conveyed by disjunctions, and between
semantic ambiguity vs. perceived ambiguity.
1 Introduction
The ambiguity of natural language poses problems for any formal theory within Lin-
guistics, Philosophy, Cognitive Psychology or Artificial Intelligence. If one tries to set
up a formal framework dealing with ambiguous expressions, one immediately faces in-
teresting fundamental questions about the nature of ambiguity: How should the formal
semantics of an ambiguous expression be defined? What is the information conveyed
by ambiguous expressions? When is an expression perceived as ambiguous? The last
question is relevant since speakers are often not aware of the fact that they have said
something which is ambiguous.
These questions show that ambiguity mainly becomes relevant in situations where
more than one person is involved. In this paper, we analyze when ambiguities arise by
looking at a multi-agent system, where the agents also communicate with ambiguous
statements. Analyzing ambiguity in a multi-agent system is promising since it allows
us to create an artificial dialog situation where the environment is clearly defined and
the issues mentioned above can be analyzed under sterile conditions.
Additionally, multi-agent systems are not only interesting as a tool for semanticists
to formalize some pragmatic aspects. Existing multi-agent communication languages
like KQML (Labrou and Finin 1994) and ACL (FIPA 1999) use some of Grice’s co-
operative principles (Grice 1989) to define the semantics of the agent language and
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make use of pragmatic notions stemming from speech act theory (cf. Searle 1969) to
implement more complex forms of agent communication.
2 A Multi-Agent System with Ambiguity
The framework as it is proposed here, is to some extent similar to the contextual ap-
proach of Buvacˇ (1996), who also uses a modal logic to formalize ambiguity. On the
other hand, his approach is restricted to a single-agent scenario, and therefore not ap-
propriate to answer the questions we mentioned in the preceding section.
2.1 The Framework
The scenario is very basic. Each member of a group of n agents knows some facts
about the world and the other agents. The only action taking place, is that one of the
agents tells a group of other agents what he knows. Is is assumed that he only tells
things that he knows to be true and that the other agents do not doubt what he is saying.
Two agents might differ in what they know, but for simplicity, it is assumed that their
knowledge is non-conflicting.
To model the information state of the agents, we use valued rooted Kripke structures
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, w  W , and V is a valuation function, V : W  2,
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2 being the powerset of the set of propositional variables  . As usual, W is a set of
possible worlds,

a finite set of Agents, and


Ri  i  is a set of accessibility relations
between worlds for each agent i 

. We say that wRiw  if agent i considers world
w  possible in world w. Knowledge is expressed by a set of modal operators


Ki  i 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ϕ for all w  such that wRiw  . In the sequel, we
sometimes omit the valuation:
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Group knowledge (E) and common knowledge (C) are defined as in Fagin et al.
(1995):   w   EGϕ iff
 
w  
"!
i  G Kiϕ and
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CGϕ  . Information structures are fully introspective and serial; i.e., they are in KD45n:
For all w  W and i 

it holds that
(D)   w % '& Ki ( (seriality)
(4)   w %  Kiϕ  KiKiϕ (positive introspection)
(5)   w % '& Kiϕ  Ki
&
Kiϕ (negative introspection)
The agents are endowed with very limited communicative capabilities. In fact, the
only communicative acts are of the form )+*-,-,
 
i

G

S  , which is defined as follows:
Definition 1 ()+*.,-,) *-, ,) * , , ) )+*.,/, is a function from valued rooted Kripke structures to valued
rooted Kripke structures. It can be seen as an update function. Additionally, )+*.,-, has
three parameters,
 
i


G


S  , where i is an agent (the speaker), G 0 21-
 i

is a group
of agents (the hearers),1 and S is a natural language sentence belonging to some (not
further specified) fragment 3 eng of English.
1The restriction that the speaker is not part of the group of hearers is mainly due to formal convenience,
as it simplifies the implementation of some of the cooperative principles.
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Although being desirable, it is not possible in the proposed framework that two
communicative acts take place at the same time. Allowing two or more )+*.,-, -actions
to take place at the same time, would require parallel updating. Again, for simplicity,
we do not consider this possibility.
A function τ from 3 eng to 3 PL0 (propositional logic) generates the possible se-
mantic representations of S. Actually, τ
 
S  returns the set of equivalence classes of
the readings, such that readings which are equivalent belong to the same class. 4 ϕ 5
indicates the equivalence class ϕ belongs to.
Definition 2 (Semantic Ambiguity) If S 3 eng, then S is said to be semantically am-
biguous iff  τ
 
S 687 1, i.e., there are at least two non-equivalent ways to represent the
semantics of S.
The fact that s is semantically ambiguous does not mean that it is also perceived as
ambiguous by the speaker or the hearer(s), cf. Poesio (1996). In Section 2.2, we will
see how to define the difference between semantic and perceived ambiguity formally.
We are aware of the fact that propositional logic is not expressive enough to be an
appropriate representation language for the semantics of natural language utterances,
but this restriction allows us to blend out further intricacies that can arise in a multi-
agent system for natural language dialogs (see, e.g., Francez and Berg 1994), so we
can focus on issues that are strictly related to the problem of ambiguity.
2.2 Implementing Cooperative Principles
Before we discuss in more detail how ambiguity is treated, we pose some general
constraints on the execution of communicative acts. These constraints are based on
Grice’s maxims, cf. Grice (1989), and can be considered as a partial implementation of
Grice’s maxims in a multi-agent system, see also Labrou and Finin (1994) and FIPA
(1999) for different ways of integrating Grice’s maxims into an agent communication
language.
Definition 3 (Cooperative Principles) Given a valued rooted Kripke structure of the
form
 
w

V  representing the current information state, the following constraints
are imposed on the application of )+*-,-, . If )+*-,-,
 
i
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
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 
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9 


w 

V : , then
;
4 ϕ 5< τ
 
S  such that
(i)   w V %  Kiϕ
Maxim of Quality: do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. This
is implemented by requiring that a speaker knows that at least one of the readings
of S is true.
(ii)   w V %  Ki
&
C = i >@? Gϕ
Maxim of Quantity: make your contribution as informative as is required for
the current purposes of the exchange. Agent i knows that at least one reading of
S is not part of the common knowledge.
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(iii) Affi4ψ 5< τ   S  1-
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Maxim of Manner: avoid ambiguity. Agent i knows that it is common knowl-
edge amongst the speaker and the hearers that either all readings ψ of S, such
that 4ψ 5D

4 ϕ 5 , are true (and therefore uninformative) or false (an therefore con-
flicting).
(iv)     w   V :E  C = i >B? Gϕ
Grounding Criterion: After telling S, ϕ is common knowledge of the hearers
and the speaker (i).
Similar to Labrou and Finin (1994), these conditions are divided into pre-conditions
that have to hold before a communicative action can be executed (i.e., before updating
the original Kripke model) and post-conditions that describe what has to hold after-
wards.
(i)–(iii) are the pre-conditions of applying tell to a valued Kripke structure. (iv)
is the post-condition, where the speaker’s contribution is added to the common knowl-
edge, see e.g. Clark and Schaefer (1992).
Updating in a multi-agent system where the pre-conditions (i)–(iii) are implemented
as hard constraints will always yield a resulting state which satisfies the post-condition
(iv). I.e., although the agents can communicate with semantically ambiguous sen-
tences, it cannot happen that such a sentence is also perceived as ambiguous by the
hearer(s).
On the other hand, if the pre-conditions (i)–(iii) are implemented as default con-
straints, and, for instance, the Maxim of Manner is violated by a speaker, the Grounding
Criterion is not guaranteed to hold.
Definition 4 (Perceived Ambiguity) Let S be a semantically ambiguous sentence, as
defined in Definition 2, )+*.,-,
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S 
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V : , and the following con-
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Then, we say that S is perceived as ambiguous.
Detection of ambiguity is also important for building intelligent dialog systems,
because it can inform the system to apply repair strategies, cf. McRoy and Hirst (1995).
This illustrates also the difference between ambiguity and disjunction. If an am-
biguous sentence S is treated the same way as the disjunction of its m readings G mk O 1 ϕk,
it would result in a weaker post-condition of the form
 


w 

V :ffi

C = i >B? G
G
m
k O 1 ϕk.
Finally, we mention another important constraint on updating, namely the preser-
vation of known facts.
Definition 5 (Information Increase) Let 
 Ki QPi  be the set of finite concatenations of
elements of


Ki
 i  , including the empty sequence ε. If RK 


Ki
QPi  and
 
w
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
RKϕ, then )+*.,/,
 
i

G

S 
 
w

V E

RKϕ.
This definition of information increase, which is a more general reformulation of Groen-
eveld’s descriptive information increase, cf. Groeneveld (1995).
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2.3 Updating with Ambiguous Information
Let us consider an example. The Kripke-structures depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 2,
represent the information state of Agent 1 and Agent 2, respectively.2 We restrict
ourselves to two propositional variables p and q. Agent 1 does know that p holds, but
is uncertain about the truth of q. In addition, he does not know whether Agent 2 knows
p or q, or whether Agent 2 knows whether Agent 1 knows p or q, etc.
w
p S q
1
p S q
2
p ST q
2
T p S q
2
T p ST q
2
1 U 2 1 U 2 1 U 2
p ST q
1
p S q
2
p ST q
2
T p S q
2
T p ST q
2
1 U 2 1 U 2 1 U 2
1
Figure 1: A Kripke model representing the information state of Agent 1
More formally, the following holds:
1.
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Figure 2: A Kripke model representing the information state of Agent 2
Agent 2, on the other hand does know:
1.
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If Agent 1 tells Agent 2 that S is the case, where τ
 
S 
W

p

q

, then the model in
Figure 1 and Figure 2 has to be updated with )+*-,-,
 
1


2


S  . Again, focusing on the
information state of Agent 1, this results in the Kripke-structures displayed by Figure 3
and Figure 4.
2Note that both figures belong to the same Kripke structure. The split-up is entirely due to space limita-
tions.
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1 U 2 1 U 2
p ST q
1
p S q
2
p ST q
2
p ST q
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p S q
2
T p S q
2
1 U 2 1 U 2
1 1 1
Figure 3: The information state of Agent 1 after updating with S
Having told S to Agent 2, Agent 1 knows that Agent 2 either knows that p holds or
that he knows that q holds, i.e., )+*.,-,
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Figure 4: The information state of Agent 2 after updating with S
Determining the resulting information state of Agent 2 is a bit more complex. First
of all, to which extent should Agent 2 obey the cooperative principles? We know that
Agent 1 violated the maxim of manner, but Agent 1 does not know that. For simplicity,
we assume that the hearer(s) give the speaker full credit, which means that they think
that the speaker obeys all cooperative principles.
Turning to Figure 4, there are four possibilities, two for each reading of S. Either
Agent 2 thinks that Agent 1 intended to say p, because he is uncertain about the truth
of q or because he knows that q is not true; and analogously for q, the other reading of
S.
3 Conclusions
We have seen that, to some extent, ambiguity can be modeled in a multi-agent system.
It became also clear that this is certainly a non-trivial task, involving a lot of intricacies,
most of which we have simplified in this paper. The presented framework is mainly
intended to give a rough idea how to formalize ambiguity in a multi-agent system,
where several extensions are still needed. In particular, we intend to put future efforts
into tackling two problems. How to extend the framework to first-order (dynamic)
logic, and which other pragmatic principles can be implemented?
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